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Constitutional and Statutory
Limits on the Power to Tax
By JA_.s E. SABINE*
Drawing the appropriate boundary between state power to tax and
the limitations imposed by the federal constitution has long been a
function of the United States Supreme Court. Recently Congress has
entered upon the scene and laid down some ground rules regarding
state taxation of income derived by out-of-state vendors from the sale
of tangible personal property. This legislation has provided certainty
in some respects but has brought with it some questions of statutory
interpretation.
The states, themselves, at times have provided by statute for a lesser
exercise of state power to tax than that deemed permissible by the Su-
preme Court under the federal constitution.
In the discussion which follows, the focus will be upon the federal
constitutional provisions most frequently considered by the Supreme
Court in relation to state taxing power-the commerce clause and the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment-the recently enacted
federal legislation and some of the pertinent California statutes, deci-
cisions and administrative interpretations concerning the extent to
which the power to tax is or may be exercised.1
I. Commerce Clause
A. Court Decisions
In considering the extent to which the commerce clause is a re-
striction on state taxation, attention must be given to the form or inci-
* A.B. University of Utah 1930; LL.B. University of California 1937; Lecturer in
Law University of California School of Law; Chairman, Committee on Penalty and Lien
Policy, National Association of Tax Administrators; Assistant Attorney General of Cali-
fornia.
(The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Attorney General's Office.)
'In this article no atempt is made at a comprehensive statement of the federal
constitutional law as it has developed in relation to state taxation. The approach rather
is to provide a framework of some of the basic principles which have evolved under
the commerce clause, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the federal
constitution and to consider the application of these principles to the California system of
taxation under the Personal Income Tax Law (CAL. Ruv. & T.C. §§ 17001-19500) and
the Bank and Corporation Tax Law (CArL. REv. & T.C. §§ 23001-26481). Along with
this there will be some discussion of limits self-imposed by California in its statutes.
[23]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
dence of the tax.2 The draftsmen of the California tax laws had the
insight to recognize this and, accordingly, provided for a franchise
tax measured by net income applicable to corporations which engage
in at least some intrastate business in California and a tax on net in-
come applicable to corporations which engage exclusively in interstate
commerce.3 The significance of the distinction between a privilege tax
and a net income tax4 is apparent from the following brief summary of
United States Supreme Court decisions.
Corporations engaged in the taxing state in both intrastate com-
merce and interstate or foreign commerce may be subjected to a fran-
chise tax measured by net income reasonably attributable to the taxing
state, even though part of the income so attributable is from interstate
or foreign commerce. This is true whether the corporation is domestic5
or foreign.r
Corporations may not be subjected to a franchise tax on the priv-
ilege of doing business if they engage exclusively in interstate com-
merce. 7 They, however, may be subjected to a net income tax on that
portion of their net income reasonably attributable to the taxing state
even if they are foreign corporations and are engaging exclusively in
interstate commerce.8
In Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota,9 de-
cided in February, 1959, the United States Supreme Court removed
any lingering doubt as to state power to tax net income derived exclu-
sively from interstate commerce. Within approximately six months
2 Barrett, "Substance" vs. "Form" in the Application of the Commerce Clause to
State Taxation, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 740 (1953). Sabine, Interstate Commerce and State
Taxation in the Supreme Court, 1950 Term, 26 CAL. S.B.J. 347 (1951). Sabine, State
Franchise and Income Taxation of Corporations Engaged in Interstate Commerce, REv-
ENUE ADMINISTRATION 1957 (National Association of Tax Administrators, Chicago).
"... The incidence of the tax provides the answer ..... Spector Motor Service v.
O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 608 (1951).
3 CAL. REV. & T.C. §§ 23151, 23501. The opinion of the California Supreme Court
in West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 27 Cal. 2d 705, 708, 166 P.2d 861, 863, (1946), ex-
plains the difference between a net income tax and a franchise tax and the function
served by each.
4 Brown, The Nature of the Income Tax, 17 MINN. L. REv. 127 (1933).
Matson Nay. Co. v. State Board, 3 Cal. 2d 1, 43 P.2d 805, aff'd, 297 U.S. 441
(1935).
6 Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 664, 111 P.2d 334, aff'd 315 U.S. 501
(1941).
7 Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
8 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959);
West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 27 Cal. 2d 705, 166 P.2d 861, aff'd per curiam, 328
U.S. 823 (1946).
9358 U.S. 450 (1959).
[Vol. 12
after the decision, however, a federal statute' ° was enacted, limiting
1073 Stat. 555 (1959), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 381-84 (Supp. 1959).
TITLE I -IMPOSITION OF MINIMUM STANDARD
Section 101. (a) No State, or political subdivision thereof, shall have power to im-
pose, for any taxable year ending after the date of the enactment of this Act, a net
income tax on the income derived within such State by any person from interstate com-
merce if the only business activities within such State by or on behalf of such person
during such taxable year are either, or both, of the following:
(1) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such
State for sales of tangible personal property, which orders are sent outside the
State for approval or rejection, and, if approved, are filled by shipment or deliv-
ery from a point outside the State; and
(2) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such
State in the name of or for the benefit of a prospective customer of such person,
if orders by such customer to such person to enable such customer to fill orders
resulting from such solicitation are orders described in paragraph (1).
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall not apply to the imposition of a net
income tax by any State, or political subdivision thereof, with respect to:
(1) any corporation which is incorporated under the laws of such State; or
(2) any individual who, under the laws of such State, is domiciled in,
or a resident of, such State.
(c) For purposes of subsection (a), a person shall not be considered to have en-
gaged in business activities within a State during any taxable year merely by reason of
sales in such State, or the solicitation of orders for sales in such State, of tangible personal
property on behalf of such person by one or more independent contractors, or by reason
of the maintenance of an office in such State by one or more independent contractors
whose activities on behalf of such person in such State consist solely of making sales, or
soliciting orders for sales, of tangible personal property.
(d) For purposes of this section:
(1) the term "independent contractor" means a commission agent, broker,
or other independent contractor who is engaged in selling, or soliciting orders
for the sale of, tangible personal property for more than one principal and who
holds himself out as such in the regular course of his business activities; and
(2) the term "representative" does not include an independent contractor.
Section 102. (a) No State, or political subdivision thereof, shall have power to
assess, after the date of the enactment of this Act, any net income tax which was im-
posed by such State or political subdivision, as the case may be, for any taxable year
ending on or before such date, on the income derived within such State by any person
from interstate commerce, if the imposition of such tax for a taxable year ending after
such date is prohibited by section 101.
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall not be construed:
(1) to invalidate the collection, on or before the date of the enactment of
this Act, of any net income tax imposed for a taxable year ending on or before
such date, or
(2) to prohibit the collection, after the date of the enactment of this Act, of
any net income tax which was assessed on or before such date for a taxable
year ending on or before such date.
Section 103. For purposes of this title, the term "net income tax" means any tax
imposed on, or measured by, net income.
Section 104. If any provision of this title or the application of such provision to any
person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this title or the application of
such provision to persons or circumstances other than those to which it is held invalid,
shall not be affected thereby.
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to some extent state power to tax income from interstate commerce."
B. Federal Legislation
State power to impose a net income tax on income derived within
the state by any person 12 from interstate commerce is restricted by
the federal statute only if the business activities within the state by or
on behalf of such person are limited to:
(1) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative,
for sales of tangible personal property, which orders are sent outside
the state for approval or rejection, and, if approved, are filled by ship-
ment or delivery from a point outside the state; 13 and
(2) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative,
in such state in the name of or for the benefit of a prospective customer
of such person, if orders by such customer to such person to enable
such customer to fill orders resulting from such solicitation are orders
described in paragraph (1) ;14 and
(3) sales in the state, or the solicitation of orders for sales in the
state, of tangible personal property on behalf of such person by one
or more independent contractors, and the maintenance of an office in
the state by one or more independent contractors whose activities on
behalf of such person in the state consist solely of making sales, or
soliciting orders for sales of tangible personal property. 5
The last mentioned provision signifies that an independent con-
tractor may make sales of tangible personal property in the state or
TITLE II - STUDY AND REPORT BY CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
Section 201. The Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and
the Committee on Finance of the United States Senate, acting separately or jointly, or
both, or any duly authorized subcommittees thereof, shall make full and complete studies
of all matters pertaining to the taxation by the States of income derived within the
States from the conduct of business activities which are exclusively in furtherance of
interstate commerce or which are a part of interstate commerce, for the purpose of
recommending to the Congress proposed legislation providing uniform standards to be
observed by the States in imposing income taxes on income so derived.
Section 202. The Committees shall report to their respective Houses the results of
such studies together with their proposals for legislation on or before July 1, 1962.
11 Mickey and Mickum, Congressional Regulation of State Taxation of Interstate
Commerce, 38 N.C.L. REV. 119 (1960); 46 VA. L. REV. 297 (1960); 108 U. PA. L.
REV. 1077 (1960).
12 "Person" as used in the federal statute includes corporation and individual.
1-373 Stat. 555 (1959); 15 U.S.C.A. §381(a)(1) (Supp. 1959).
1473 Stat. 555 (1959); 15 U.S.C.A. §381(a)(2) (Supp. 1959). This abstruse
provision may be more meaningful if its application is illustrated. The following is an
example of a factual situation to which the provision would apply: An out-of-state man-
ufacturer has a prospective customer in the taxing state who is a wholesaler. A represen-
tative of the manufacturer solicits orders for the wholesaler from retailers. To fill the
orders, the wholesaler then sends its order to the out-of-state manufacturer who fills the
order by shipment from a point outside the state.
1573 Stat. 555 (1959); 15 U.S.C.A. § 381(c) (Supp. 1959).
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may maintain an office in the state without causing the out-of-state
sellers whom he represents to lose the benefit of the statute if his only
activities on behalf of the sellers consist of making sales or soliciting
orders for sales of tangible personal property.
The scope of the federal statute is limited. It applies only to -income
from sales of tangible personal property."6 It does not apply, therefore,
to income from sales of intangible property. It does not apply to income
from services as distinguished from sales. Thus, it does not apply to in-
come from communication or transportation. It does not apply, there-
fore, to the usual activities of airlines, railroads, trucking companies,
newspapers, or radio and television stations. The statute, moreover, does
not apply with respect to a domestic corporation or any individual who
is domiciled in or a resident of the taxing state.
17
The statute undoubtedly was intended to settle certain questions
as to the scope of state power to tax but it raises many new questions
of interpretation of the statutory language. A problem that suggests
itself at the outset is what guides shall be followed in interpreting the
statute. Some of the phrases not defined in the statute, for example,
"tangible personal property," have heen construed by state courts for
other purposes and the state courts have not always been in complete
agreement in these interpretations. Shall local decisions govern the
interpretation of the federal statute? The United States Supreme Court
would have the final say and, since the purpose of the statute is to
achieve uniformity, the Court would not be likely to allow differing
local interpretations to govern but presumably would announce a basic
interpretation applicable in all states.
Here are some examples of provisions in the federal statute which
the courts may be called upon to interpret:
1. Solicitation of Orders
The word "solicitation" may very well include such activities as
radio, television and newspaper advertising, as well as business done
by mail or telephone contact. 8 Under the federal statute, the mere
presence of solicitors in a state would not enable the state to subject
a foreign corporation to state income tax. There is almost universal
agreement, however, that the maintenance of a sales office constitutes
more than mere solicitation and provides sufficient basis for the im-
position of a state tax.19 This view is supported by the legislative history
since a specific provision permitting maintenance of a sales office with-
16 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1077, 1084 (1960).
17 73 Stat. 555 (1959); 15 U.S.C.A. § 381(b) (Supp. 1959).
Is 46 VA. L. REv. 297, 314 (1960).
19 46 VA. L. REv. 297, 315 (1960).
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The statute relates to solicitation of orders for "sales" of tangible
personal property. Persons merely providing services are not protected
by the statute. A problem arises, however, where the sales contract
includes a provision for some future servicing, such as installation, con-
sultation, supervision or repairs. The question arises whether a foreign
corporation might render itself liable for taxation on all its income
derived from the taxing state if, in addition to the solicitation of orders
for sales, it renders certain services.
21
3. Tangible Personal Property
To gain the protection of the federal statute, the solicitation of
orders must be for the sale of tangible personal property. The statute
does not define this phrase. Questions might arise, for example, where
such substances as gas or electricity are involved. The phrase "tangible
personal property" appears in the sales and use tax laws of many states
and there are some borderline situations in which the states are not
in complete agreement as to what constitutes "tangible personal prop-
erty." Since we are here concerned with a federal statute, there no
doubt would be strong support for the view that the statute should
receive uniform interpretation and enforcement.
4. Approval and Shipment From Outside State
If a foreign corporation is to enjoy immunity under the federal
statute, not only must its employees transmit offers out of the state
for approval, but also the goods must be shipped from outside the state.
Tax liability may result if the seller uses its own delivery vehicles.
Problems also arise in consignment sales. Situations exist in which
the goods already are in the taxing state before solicitation occurs.
Title remains in the foreign corporation until the goods have been sold
by the consignee. Since there is no shipment from outside the state
after solicitation, the argument can be made that the seller does not
qualify for the protection of the statute.
22
5. Independent Contractor
The federal statute provides a person shall not be considered to
have engaged in business activities within a state merely by reason of
20 105 CONG. REc. 15099, 15107 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1959).
21 46 VA. L. REV. 297, 316 (1960).
2246 VA. L. REV. 297, 318 (1960).
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sales or the solicitation of orders for sales in the state on behalf of
such person by independent contractors.
23
The statute defines "independent contractor" as "a commission
agent, broker, or other independent contractor who is engaged in sell-
ing, or soliciting orders for the sale of, tangible personal property for
more than one principal and who holds himself out as such in the
regular course of his business activities."24 Since the statute defines an
"independent contractor" in part as an "independent contractor," it
is obvious that administrative and judicial interpretation will be re-
quired. The distinction between an independent contractor and an
employee has been a frequent subject of controversy in such areas as
those covered by state unemployment insurance acts, the Social Se-
curity Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act. The extent to which
precedents under these acts will be used in interpreting this new fed-
eral statute remains to be seen.
6. Assessment
The federal statute provides that it shall not be construed to pro-
hibit the collection of any net income tax which was "assessed" on or
before the date of enactment of the statute for a taxable year ending
on or before such date.25 The question arises as to when a tax is "as-
sessed." For example, a notice may have been sent to the taxpayer prior
to the enactment of the federal statute informing the taxpayer it was
being assessed a certain amount and that this assessment would become
final if the taxpayer did not protest within a specified period of time.
Suppose the federal statute was enacted before the time for filing pro-
test had expired.
Another possible situation would be where the agency charged
with administering the tax had sent out the notice, had received the
protest of the taxpayer, had denied the protest, and the taxpayer had
availed itself of the opportunity provided by a particular statute of
appealing to another administrative agency for review. Suppose these
steps were taken prior to the enactment of the federal statute, but the
reviewing administrative agency had not reached its decision by the
time the federal statute was enacted.
The California State Board of Equalization recently considered this
latter question in the Appeal of American Snuff Co.,26 decided April 20,
1960. The taxpayer contended that the word "assessed" should be con-
2373 Stat. 555 (1959); 15 U.S.C.A. § 381(c) (Supp. 1959).
2473 Stat. 555 (1959); 15 U.S.C.A. § 381(d) (Supp. 1959).
2573 Stat. 555 (1959); 15 U.S.C.A. § 382(b)(2) (Supp. 1959).
28 Appeal of American Snuff Co., CAL. ST. BD. OF EQuAL., April 20, 1960; CCH 3
CAL. TA X CA s 201-538; P-H STATE & LocAL TAx SEuv. Cal. 13223.
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strued as meaning that the tax was not "assessed" until the assessment
became final. In rejecting this contention, the Board, in its opinion,
stated:
The federal act does not define "assessed." Nothing in the com-
mittee reports or legislative history regarding the act indicates any
special definition of the word ...
Uniformity in the application of the federal legislation will be
best achieved by adherence to the commonly accepted view that
the initial determination of a tax by the appropriate administrative
agency constitutes an assessment.
The foregoing questions of statutory interpretation, while not ex-
haustive, are an indication that all problems have not been miracu-
lously solved by the enactment of the federal statute.
II. Due Process Clause
A. Source of Income
The power of a state to tax net income derived from sources within
the state is well established, even as to nonresident individuals27 and
foreign corporations.2 8 Foreign corporations, however, may not be
taxed on income from sources without the taxing state,29 except pos-
sibly corporations having a commercial domicile in the state.
30
Since the California tax statutes limit the personal income tax on
nonresidents to income from sources within California 31 and the tax
on both domestic and foreign corporations to a tax on or measured by
net income derived from sources in California, 32 the significance of the
statutory phrase "net income derived from or attributable to sources
within this state" is apparent.
Consideration, accordingly, will be given to certain types of income
in relation to source.
33
27 Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920).
28 West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 27 Cal. 2d 705, 711, 712-713, 166 P.2d 861,
864, 865-866, affirmed per curiam, 328 U.S. 823 (1946); Northwestern States Portland
Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 464 (1959).
29 Hans Rees' Sons Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
3o See notes 52, 53, 57, 68-71 infra.
31 CAL. REV. & T.C. § 17041.
32 CAL. REV. & T.C. § 25101.
33 The California Bank and Corporation Tax Law provides:
"Income derived from or attributable to sources within this State includes income
from tangible or intangible property located or having a situs in this State and income
from any activities carried on in this State, regardless of whether carried on in intrastate,
interstate or foreign commerce." CAL. REV. & T.C. § 23040.
For California's treatment of income from intangibles which is part of the unitary
income see Wahrhaftig, infra this issue.
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1. Business Income
Income from business activities has its source in the state in which
those activities are conducted. Thus, income from business activities
in California constitutes income from sources in California within the
meaning of the statute34 and is constitutionally taxable. 5 "... Taxation
by states in which a corporation carries on business activities is justified
by the advantages that attend the pursuit of such activities...."
3 6
Where business activities in more than one state are so interrelated
as to constitute a unitary business, that portion of the unitary income
reasonably attributable to the taxing state is regarded as having its
source in that state and may be taxed.3
7
2. Income From Personal Services
The source of income from personal services generally is regarded
as in the state in which the personal services are rendered.38 Nonresi-
dent entertainers, professional people, employees and others receiving
compensation for services performed in California thus are treated by
the California personal income tax regulations as having income from
sources within this state.3 9
3. Income From Real Estate and Tangible Personal Property
Income from real estate generally is regarded as having its source
in the state in which the real estate is located.40 The California personal
income tax regulations treat as income from sources in California rents
-from real or tangible personal property in the state, gains realized from
the sale or transfer of such property and any other type of income de-
rived from the ownership, control or management of real and tangible
personal property located in the state.41 The California bank and cor-
poration tax regulations are to the same effect.
4 2
34 CAL. REV. & T.C. § 23040.
35 West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 27 Cal. 2d 705, 711, 712-713, 166 P.2d 861,
864, 865-866, affirmed per curiam, 328 U.S. 823 (1946); Northwestern States Portland
Cement Co. v. Minnesota, supra at 465.
36 West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 27 Cal. 2d 705, 711, 166 P.2d 861, 864 (1946),
citing Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co.,311 U.S. 435, 446 (1940).
37 Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113 (1920); Butler Bros.
v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942); John Deere Plow Co. v. Franchise Tax Board, 38
Cal. 2d 214, 238 P.2d 659, appeal dismissed, 343 U.S. 939 (1951).
8s ALTmAN & KEEsLiNG, ALLOCATION OF INcoMm iN STATE TAXATION 68 (2d ed.
1950).
so 18 CAL. ADM. C. Regs. 17211-17214(e).
4 0 
ALTMAN & KEESLING, ALLOCATION OF INcomE ix STATE TAXATION 74 (2d ed.
1950). See New York ex rel Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 312 (1937).
4118 CAL. ADM. C. Regs. 17211-17214(c).
42 18 CAL. ADM. C. Reg. 23040(a).
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4. Income From Intangibles
This is one of the frontier lands in relation to state power to tax.
There is much territory yet to be charted.
Since intangibles do not have a physical location 43 they frequently
are ascribed a fictional location or situs.
Generally, intangibles are said to have a situs at the domicile of
the owner of the intangibles. 4 Thus intangibles have been held to have
a situs at the legal domicile of a corporation. 45 They also have been
held to have a situs at the commercial domicile of a corporation. 46 In-
tangibles also under certain circumstances have been held to have a
business situs.
47
The significance for income tax purposes of attributing a situs to
intangible personal property is that income is regarded as having a
source at the situs of the intangible personal property. Thus, in Miller
v. McColgan,48 the question arose as to the nature of a shareholder's
interest in a corporation. The court observed that a shareholder does
not own the corporate property but merely owns stock in the corpora-
tion. The situs of the stock (an intangible) was held to be at the domi-
cile of the owner and since the stock was the source of the shareholder's
income (in the form of dividends), the state in which the shareholder
was domiciled was the state in which the income had its source.
In defining income "derived from or attributable to sources" within
California, the Bank and Corporation Tax Law expressly includes in-
come from intangible property "having a situs" in the state.
4 9
43 "The rule that property is subject to taxation at its situs, within the territorial
jurisdiction of the taxing state, readily understood and applied with respect to tangibles,
is in itself meaningless when applied to intangibles which, since they are without physical
characteristics, can have no location in space.... The resort to a fiction by the attribution
of a tax situs to an intangible is only a means of symbolizing, without fully revealing, those
considerations which are persuasive grounds for deciding that a particular place is appro-
priate for the imposition of the tax .. " First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minnesota, 301 U.S.
234, 240 (1937). For a further exposition on the nature of intangibles in relation to tax-
ation see Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 365 (1939).
44 This results from application of the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam. Miller
v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 432, 439 (1941); Robinson v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 423, 425
(1941).
45 Cream of Wheat Co. v. County of Grand Forks, 253 U.S. 325 (1920); Rainier
Brewing Co. v. McColgan, 94 Cal. App. 2d 118, 210 P.2d 233 (1949).
46 Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193 (1936).
47 Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, supra, note 46; New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U.S.
309 (1899); State Board of Assessors v. Comptoir National, 191 U.S. 388 (1903); Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 205 U.S. 395 (1907). See Holly Sugar Corp. v.
Johnson, 18 Cal. 2d 218, 115 P.2d 8 (1941).
48 17 Cal. 2d 432, 110 P.2d 419 (1941).
49 CAL. REv. & T.C. § 23040.
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The California personal income tax regulations5" and bank and cor-
poration tax regulations5l cover in considerable detail the subject of
what income from intangibles constitutes income from sources within
the state.
B. Domicile of Corporations -Legal and Commercial
Domicile affords a basis for income taxation of corporations. Two
concepts of corporate domicile should be noted-legal and commercial.
The legal domicile of a corporation is the state of incorporation.
There is considerable support for the view that the state of legal dom-
icile may tax a corporation on its entire net income.52
Domicile, if limited to the state of incorporation, is an incomplete
and unsatisfactory test of state power to tax corporations. It is unreal-
istic to allow the state where a corporation happens to be incorporated
to tax its entire income, even though the corporation may have only a
nominal or no office in the state and engage in no activities there, and
to deny such power to the state where the corporation has its principal
office and in which its affairs are conducted and controlled.
5
3
A growing realization that a state other than the state of legal dom-
icile frequently has a more direct relation to the operations of a cor-
poration than the state of legal domicile, and contributes more to the
corporation in the way of opportunities, protection and benefits, has
led to the development of the doctrine of commercial domicile. This
doctrine emerged in Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox,54 intertwined with
50 18 CAL. ADM. C. Regs. 17211-17214(f).
51 18 CAL. ADM. C. Reg. 23040(a).
52 
ALTMAN & KEEsLiNc, ALLOCATION OF INCOME IN STArE TAxATION 33 (2d ed.
1950). Barrett, "Substance" vs. "Forrm" in the Application of the Commerce Clause to
State Taxation, 101 U. PA. L. 1_Ev. 740, 755 (1953). See West Publishing Co. v. McCol-
gan, 27 Cal. 2d 705, 710, 166 P.2d 861, 864, affirmed per curiam, 328 U.S. 823 (1946);
Newark Fire Ins. Co. v. State Board, 307 U.S. 313, 324 (1939) (opinion of Frankfurter,
J.); Rainier Brewing Co. v. McColgan, 94 Cal. App. 2d 118, 125, 210 P.2d 233, 237,
(1949); Rock Island Refining Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 193 Okla. 468, 145 P.2d 194
(1943). In the latter case, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma upheld a tax on the entire
net income of a domestic corporation engaged in intrastate and interstate commerce. In
dismissing an appeal from this decision "for want of a substantial federal question," the
United States Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion, Rock Island Refining Co. v. Okla-
homa Tax Commission, 322 U.S. 711 (1944), cited Lawrence v. State Tax Commission,
286 U.S. 276 (1932) and New York ex rel Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937), thereby
indicating the applicability to domestic corporations of decisions upholding the power of
the state of domicile to tax the entire net income of individuals.
53 
ALTm~w & KEESLING, ALLOCATION OF INcomim IN STATE TAXATION 64-65 (2d ed.
1950).
54 298 U.S. 193 (1936); Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. State Com'n of Revenue & Tax,
184 Kan. 713, 339 P.2d 341 (1959); Ramsey, A New Theory of Corporate Domicile for
Tax Purposes, 23 AM. BAR AssN. J. 543 (1937); 35 MicH. L. REv. 1032 (1937).
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language about business situs of intangibles5 5 It seems apparent from
later decisions, however, that commercial domicile and business situs
are separate concepts. It has been held, for example, that commercial
domicile is a basis for taxation of income from intangibles even though
the intangibles do not have a business situs in the taxing state. 56
The doctrine of commercial domicile has found acceptance in Cali-
fornia and has been applied in cases involving the corporation franchise
tax (measured by net income).
57
What factors tend to establish commercial domicile? The commer-
cial domicile of a corporation has been variously described as the state
in which was located the "real center of its business activity,"58 the
"headquarters for the transaction of business,"59 the principal office
from which its management was conducted,60 the place where the cor-
poration was "localized as to control and management,"61 the place
where the corporation was managed and operated, 62 "the state where,
under the facts, the corporation receives its greatest protection and
benefits, that state where the greatest proportion of its control exists," 63
55 Comparable language is found in First Bank Corp. v. Minnesota, 301 U.S. 234,
237 (1937).
56 Chestnut Securities Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 125 Fed. 2d 571 (10th
Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 668 (1942). Cases not involving business situs of in-
tangibles in which the United States Supreme Court has attributed significance to com-
mercial domicile include Southern Gas Corp. v. Alabama, 301 U.S. 148 (1937) and
Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Beeler, 315 U.S. 649 (1942).
57 Pacific Western Oil Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 136 Cal. App. 2d 794, 289 P.2d 287,
appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 805 (1955); Southern Pac. Co. v. McColgan, 68 Cal. App. 2d
48, 156 P.2d 81 (1945). The following interesting observation concerning commercial
domicile appears in a footnote to the dissenting opinion in Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v.
County of Los Angeles, 51 Cal. 2d 314, 328, 333 P.2d 323 (1958) (a property tax case):
"Although the state of incorporation is regarded as the legal domicile of a corporation,
its domicile for tax purposes is its principal place of business or headquarters. Thus, the
'commercial domicile' rather than the state of incorporation is given the power to tax
intangible property of the corporation on the ground that 'it is there that the owner in
every practical sense realizes the economic advantages of his ownership.' First Bank
Stock Corp. v. Minn., 301 U.S. 234, 241; see Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193;
Southern Pac. Co. v. McColgan, 68 Cal. App. 2d 48; Pacific Western Oil Corp. v. Fran-
chise Tax Bd., 136 Cal. App. 2d 794 ...."
58 GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 134 (3d ed. 1949).
59 Southern Gas Corp. v. Alabama, 301 U.S. 148, 153 (1937).
60 Ibid. "Appellant made Birmingham, Alabama, its headquarters for the transaction
of business. The 'entire management' was conducted from its principal office at that
place. There, as the state court said, was 'the control of the business in all of its aspects.'
There orders for deliveries of gas under its contracts and all collections from sales were
received and all disbursements were made or authorized. While Delaware was the state
of incorporation, appellant's commercial domicile was in Alabama. Wheeling Steel Corp.
v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193, 211."
6135 Micu. L. Rtv. 1032, 1033 (1937).
62 Smith v. Ajax Pipe Line Co., 87 F. 2d 567 (8th Cir. 1937).
63 Southern Pac. Co. v. MeColgan, supra, note 57, at 81. ". . . We perceive the law
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the state where the corporation maintains its generalbusiness offices, the
"center of authority," "the actual seat of its corporate government."6"
In Southern Pacific Co. v. McColgan,65 the court stated that the
place where the board of directors met was an important, but not con-
clusive, factor in determining where the commercial domicile of the
corporation was located. In that case, the court held the commercial
domicile was in California even though the board of directors met in
New York.(" In so holding, the court said:
6 7
The true test must be to consider all the facts relating to the particular
corporation, and all the facts relating to the intangibles in question,
and to determine from those facts which state, among all the states
involved, gives the greatest protection and benefits to the corporation,
which state, among all the states involved, from a factual and real-
istic standpoint is the domicile of the corporation. That is partially a
question of fact and partly a question of law.
It has not yet definitely been established by United States Supreme
Court decision whether the same consequences flow from commercial
domicile as from legal domicile. 68 That court has not yet squarely held,
to be that where the corporation has only a paper domicile, where the only function per-
formed by the state of incorporation is to breathe life into the corporation, and where no
substantial corporate activities are thereafter carried on in that state, then the law looks
at such corporation and says that that state where, under the facts, the corporation re-
ceives its greatest protection and benefits, that state where the greatest proportion of its
control exists, that state shall be the commercial domicile, with constitutional power to
tax income from intangibles .... "
64 Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193, 211-212. "The Corporation estab-
lished in West Virginia what has aptly been termed a 'commercial domicile.' It maintains
its general business offices at Wheeling and there it keeps its books and accounting rec-
ords. There its directors hold their meetings and its officers conduct the affairs of the
Corporation. There, as appellants counsel well says, 'the management functioned.' The
Corporation has manufacturing plants and sales offices in other States. But what is done
at those plants and offices is determined and controlled from the center of authority at
Wheeling. The Corporation has made that the actual seat of its corporate government."
Ibid.
6 68 Cal. App. 2d 48, 156 P.2d 81 (1945).
6s "... That the state where ultimate control is exercised is not necessarily the com-
mercial domicile is implicit in the holding in Smith v. Ajax Pipe Line Co., 87 F. 2d 567,
where the stock of the corporation involved was wholly owned, and therefore the cor-
poration was ultimately controlled, by a holding company located outside the taxing state.
When a corporation severs its ties in the state in which it is incorporated and engages in
no corporate activities there, but engages in activities elsewhere, the contention that, as
a matter of law the only state that can possibly be held to be its commercial domicile is
that state where its board of directors meets, is as unrealistic, unsound and artificial as
the concept that the corporation for all tax purposes is domiciled in the state of incor-
poration. It was to free the law from this last mentioned artificial and fictional concept
that the concepts of business situs and commercial domicile were applied by the
courts... 68 Cal. App. 2d at 79, 156 P.2d at 99.
67 68 Cal. App. 2d at 80, 156 P.2d at 99.
08 "... Whether the commercial domicile is on a parity with the legal domicile,
whether its power to tax is the same as that of the legal domicile, or whether it becomes
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for example, that a state in which a corporation has a commercial dom-
icile can, on that basis alone, tax its entire net income. 69 It has been
held by a lower federal court that a state of commercial domicile may
tax the income from intangibles even though there is neither physical
location of the evidence of ownership of the intangibles nor business
situs of the intangibles within the state.70 It has also been suggested
by way of dictum that the state of commercial domicile may have
power to tax all the corporation's income.
71
Despite the apparent power of the state of legal domicile, and pos-
sibly of the state of commercial domicile, to tax the entire net income
of a corporation, states having net income taxes generally have not at-
tempted to exercise such broad power but have taxed only net income
derived from sources within the taxing state.72 The California statute
so provides. 73 By application of the maxim mobilia sequuntur per-
sonam most states tax corporations having a legal or commercial dom-
icile in the state on income from intangibles.
74
C. Residence - Significance and Meaning
Domicile provides a constitutional basis for taxation of individuals
on their net income. 75 A state, therefore, may constitutionally tax a
person domiciled in the state upon income from rents of land located
outside the state.76 Persons domiciled in the state also may be taxed on
income derived from activities in other states.
77
a complete substitute for the technical domicile for tax purposes, are questions not yet
decided by the United States Supreme Court, and not involved in this case .. ." South-
ern Pacific Co. v. McColgan, 68 Cal. App. 2d 48, 81, 156 P.2d 81, 100 (1945).
69 In Southern Pacific Co. v. McColgan, and Pacific Western Oil Corp. v. Fran-
chise Tax Board, supra, note 57, the courts did not find it necessary to decide whether
income from all intangibles owned by a corporation could be taxed by the state of com-
mercial domicile since in those cases the intangibles in question were found to be rea-
sonably connected with the main business of the corporation.
70 Chestnut Sec. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Com., 125 Fed. 2d 571, (10th Cir. 1942)
cert. denied, 316 U.S. 668 (1942). See ALTMAN & KEESLING, op. cit. note 52, at 34.
71 Ibid.
72 ALTMAN & KEESLING, op. cit. note 52, at 61.
73 CAL. REV. & T. C. § 25101.
7
4 ALTMAN & KEESLINc, op. cit. note 52, at 62. Foreign corporations not commer-
cially domiciled in the state are taxable on income from intangibles only if the intangibles
are so used in connection with a trade or business therein as to acquire a business situs.
ALTMAN & KEESLING, Op. cit. note 52, at 62.
75 Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U.S. 276 (1932).
76 New York ex tel Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937).
77 Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, supra note 75. ". . . [I]ncome may be taxed
both by the state where it is earned and by the state of the recipients domicile. Protec-
tion, benefit and power over the subject matter are not confined to either state .. " State
Tax Commission v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 178 (1942), quoting from Curry v. McCan-
less, 307 U.S. 357, 368 (1939).
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"Domicile" includes the element of intention to make a place one's
home, while "residence" frequently is used to refer only to the physical
fact of living in a place .7  In many instances domicile and residence
coincide. There may be circumstances, however, in which a person is
domiciled in a state though he does not reside there and, conversely,
in which a person may reside in a state though he is not domiciled
there.7 9 Absence of intention to remain indefinitely or a present inten-
tion sometime to return to a former residence prevents the acquisition
of a new domicile but not a new residence.
80
A person who is domiciled in a state does not lose that domicile
until he has acquired a new one. Acquisition of a new domicile requires
both act and intent. Thus, acquisition of a new domicile in another
state requires not only that the person be present there but also that
he have an intention to make his permanent home there and to abandon
his former home."-
Domicile alone has been found unsatisfactory as a basis for personal
income taxation. A person may live in a state for a long period of time,
enjoying protection and benefits, without becoming domiciled in the
state. On the other hand, a person may continue to be domiciled in a
state, though residing elsewhere for an extended period. Residence,
moreover, is determined largely upon objective considerations, such as
the duration of a person's stay in the state and the nature of his activities
there, whereas domicile involves the subjective consideration of intent.
Residence, accordingly, provides a fairer and more workable basis for
income taxation than domicile. 82
California has a statutory definition of "resident" which includes
an individual who is in the state for other than a temporary or transitory
purpose, or who is domiciled in California but is out of the state for
only a temporary or transitory purpose.83 The California statute does
not purport to impose a tax on individuals who are domiciled in the
state but are residing permanently elsewhere, except as to income
derived from sources within the state.84 Within the concept of the
7 8 ALAN & KEESLiNG, op. cit. note 52, at 31. See 3 Wr=r, SuMmARY oF CAM-
roRNI LA W, 2415 (1960); Reese and Green, That Elusive Word, "Residence," 6 VAN.
L. REV. 561, 575 (1953).
79 Keesling, The Problem of Residence in State Taxation of Income, 29 CALIF. L.
1Ev. 706, 720 (1941).
80 Keesling, supra note 79, at 727.
81 Keesling, supra note 79, at 721.
8 2 
ALmAN & KEESLING, op. cit. note 52, at 41-55; Keesling, supra note 79, at
726-729.
83 CAL. REv. & T.C. § 17014.
8 4 CAL. REv. & T.C. §§ 17014, 17015, 17041.
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statute, residence once established in a state is not lost by temporary
absences therefrom.
85
There is a statutory presumption that an individual is a resident if
he spends in the aggregate more than nine months of a taxable year in
California.86 The presumption may be overcome, however, by satis-
factory evidence that the individual is in the state for only a temporary
or transitory purpose .8
Although there is a statutory presumption of residence if an indi-
vidual spends more than nine months of a taxable year in California,
this does not mean that an individual may not be a "resident" within
the meaning of the statute simply because he does not spend nine
months of a particular taxable year in the state.8 8 All the pertinent
facts must be considered. 89
The California tax is imposed upon the entire taxable income of
residents and upon the income of nonresidents derived from sources
within California."
The California appellate courts have not had occasion to construe
the scope of the term "resident" for purposes of the personal income
tax. The statutory provision has been the subject, however, of numerous
opinions of the California State Board of Equalization.91 It also has
been interpreted in considerable detail in the California Personal In-
come Tax Regulations.
92
The opinions of the United States Supreme Court in Lawrence v.
State Tax Commission9" and New York ex rel Cohn v. Graves,"4 though
concerned with domicile, indicate that residence as defined by the
California statute is an adequate basis to sustain taxation.
D. Foreign Trusts and Estates
The general practice of states which tax net income of estates and
trusts is to follow the broad outlines of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954. Thus, income which is currently distributed or distributable to
the beneficiaries is taxable to them. Income which is accumulated is
8 5 CAL. REV. & T.C. § 17014.
86 CAL. REV. & T.C. § 17016.
87 Ibid.
S8 18 CAL. ADM. C. Regs. 17013-17015(e).
89 BocK, 1960 GUmEBOOK TO CALIFORNIA TA s, 103.
90 CAL. REV. & T.C. § 17041. The tax under certain circumstances is reduced by a
credit for net income taxes imposed by and paid to another state. CAL. REV. & T.C. §§
18001, 18002.
91 See annotation to CAL. REV. & T.C. § 17014 in Revenue Laws of California (State
Board of Equalization, 1959).
9 2 CAL. ADM. C. Regs. 17013-17015(a) to (f).
93 Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U.S. 276 (1932).
94 New York ex rel Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937).
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taxable to the estate or trust.95 California follows this method.
96
The discussion which follows concerns trusts and estates which
have some out-of-state element such as a nonresident trustee or ben-
eficiary.
1. Trusts
a. Distributed or Distributable Income
Resident beneficiaries are taxed by California on trust income cur-
rently distributed or distributable to them regardless of whether the
corpus of the trust is located within or without the state and regardless
of whether the trustee is a resident or nonresident.9 7 The constitution-
ality of such taxation is established.98
Nonresident beneficiaries are taxed on trust income currently dis-
tributed or distributable to them if the income is derived from sources
in California? 9 There appears to be adequate support for the consti-
tutionality of this statutory provision.100 The California Personal In-
come Tax Law provides that distributed or distributable trust income
is income from sources within California only if distributed or distribu-
table out of income of the trust derived from sources within Cali-
fornia.10 1 For purposes of determining the source of the income, the
nonresident beneficiary is deemed to be the owner of intangible per-
sonal property from which the income of the trust is derived.
10 2
b. Accumulated Income
Trusts are taxed upon all income accumulated in trust or held for
future distribution, regardless of the source from which derived, if the
trustee or the beneficiary is a resident of California.'0 3 If, however,
the trustee and beneficiary are nonresidents, such income is taxed only
if derived from sources within the state. 04
The constitutional validity of a tax by the state of residence of the
trustee on accumulated net income appears to have acceptance by the
95 ALTmAN & KEEsLiNc, ALLOCATION OF INcomE iN STATE TAXATioN 56 (2d ed.
1950); Traynor, State Taxation of Trust Income, 22 IowA L. REv. 268 (1937).
96 CAL. REV. & T.C. §§ 17742, 17751, 17752, 17761 and 17762.
97 CAL. REV. &T.C.§§ 17071(15), 17752, and 17762.
98Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19 (1938); 52 HAv. L. REv. 326
(1938). Cf. Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276 (1932); New York ex rel. Cohn
v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937).
9 9 CAL. REv. & T.C. §§ 17752(d), 17762(d) and 17953.
100 Cf. Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920).
101 CAL. REv. & T.C. § 17953.
102 Ibid.
103 CAL. REv. & T.C. §§ 17041, 17731, 17742. See § 17745 (liability of beneficiaries
for tax on income taxable to trust).
104 Ibid.
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United States Supreme Court.10 5 The Court, however, has not yet had
occasion to decide the validity of a tax with respect to accumulated
income where the trustee is a nonresident and the tax is founded on
residence of the beneficiary.106
The California statute contains special provisions for situations in
which there are two or more trustees or two or more beneficiaries, one




If the decedent was a resident of California at the time of his death,
all of the estate's taxable income is taxed by California. 08 If the dece-
dent was a nonresident, income of the estate from California sources
is taxed to the estate 0 9 unless the income is distributed or distributable
to California beneficiaries." 0 Any income distributed or distributable
to a beneficiary who is a California resident is taxed to the beneficiary,
regardless of the source of the income."'
Income of estates distributed or distributable to nonresident bene-
ficiaries is regarded as income from sources within California only if
distributed or distributable out of income of the estate derived from
sources within California. 1 1 2 For purposes of determining the source
of the income, the nonresident beneficiary is deemed to be the owner
of the intangible personal property from which the income of the trust
is derived."13
III. Conclusion
State tax laws generally survive attack under the commerce clause
and due process clause of the federal commerce if they do not dis-
criminate against interstate commerce, 114 if the proper "constitutional
channel"1 5 is selected for the incidence of the tax and if there exists
105 See Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19, 23. Cf. Greenough v. Tax As-
sessors, 331 U.S. 486 (1947).
106 See 31 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 234 (1958); Traynor, State Taxation of Trust Income,
22 IowA L. REv. 268 (1937).
107 CAL. REV. & T.C. §§ 17743, 17744. See Greenough v. Tax Assessors, 331 U.S.
486 (1947).
108 CAL. REV. & T.C. § 17742.
109 CAL. REv. & T.C. §§ 17041, 17731(b).
110 CAL. REV. & T.C. § 17761. "Beneficiary" is defined as including heir, legatee and
devisee. CAL. REv. & T.C. § 17742.
111 CAL. REV. & T.C. §§ 17041, 17762.
112 CAL. REv. & T.C. § 17953.
113 Ibid.
114 See Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 302 U.S. 602, 607 (1951).
115 Id. at 608.
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"some definite link, some minimum connection" constituting a "nex-
us"116 between the state and the person, property or transaction it
seeks to tax.
What the United States Supreme Court might regard as the mini-
mum contact or activity in the taxing state sufficient to sustain state
power to tax net income may not be known in the area of sales of
tangible personal property by out-of-state vendors because of the inter-
vention of federal legislation (Public Law 86-272). This legislation
presents a number of questions of statutory interpretation.
Certain realistic trends are observable in the development of the
doctrine of commercial domicile as a basis for taxation of corporations
and in the emphasis upon residence in the taxation of individuals.
Despite the many years of state taxation of net income and the con-
siderable body of litigation which has ensued all the answers have
not yet been provided nor is it reasonable to anticipate they ever will
be in this dynamic relationship between the individual or the business
community and state government.
ll Scripto v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 210-211 (1960).
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